A site on the future of psychology

Jonathan Haidt (pronounced HITE) is fast becoming one of the best known social psychologists, having done influential work in positive psychology and now in moral and political psychology. Continuing with the theme of analyzing leading developments in the field, in this post I am going to comment on Haidt’s TEDTalk, which was on the moral roots of liberal and conservative politics. (Disclaimer: Jon is at the University of Virginia, which is about 40 minutes from my home, and I have presented on the JH for his lab, and I consider him a friend, although I do not know him well).

Haidt’s talk contained several key messages. First, citing Steve Pinker (another hugely influential psychologist), Haidt argues that the blank slate “was one of the worst ideas psychology ever had” and it is now clear that ‘the mind’ comes with much organization prior to experience (although, of course, that organization is plastic and molded by experience). I generally agree with this statement, although I might want clarification about what exactly is meant by experience (e.g., surely there is prenatal experience, and that might be quite crucial).

Early in his talk, Haidt mentions another key point, which is that liberals and conservatives demonstrate large differences in Openness to Experience, which most personality researchers consider to be one of ‘the Big Five’ personality traits. Although I was aware of this finding, as I listened to his talk I wondered about the relationship between trait Openness and political values. Here is the issue: Traits, at least as conceived of by the major trait researchers Costa and McCrae, are seen as almost exclusively determined by genes (although it would be the subject of another post, Costa and McCrae consistently argue this point—I, however, would challenge their characterization as over-exaggerating the genetic case for traits). Political values are transmitted largely via the family (I assume this is true, but would have to explore the research on it). So I could imagine a very interesting adoption study where the trait openness of the biological parents could be analyzed and compared to the political ideology of the adoptive family in predicting the adopted individual’s political values. If anyone knows of research on this topic, I would love to hear it.

The third and primary empirical point of Haidt’s talk is on his research on the five moral value systems that he argues underlie the liberal-conservative political dimension: 1) Care for Others/Do no harm; 2) Fairness/Justice/Equality; 3) In-Group Loyalty; 4) Respect for Authority; and 5) Purity. His research shows—across large numbers of people and many different countries—that there are very reliable differences in the degree to which liberals and conservatives differ in the extent to which they endorse these values. Conservatives tend to value the five domains relatively equally. Liberals, in contrast, value the first two domains much more than the latter three.

Haidt’s final point is we need metacognitive awareness about “the Moral Matrix”. Speaking to a group dominated by liberals, Haidt argues that we should be very aware that such a group (and disciplines like psychology) likely have massive biases against conservative viewpoints. Moreover, Haidt argues (or implies), conservatives actually have a more complicated moral system, consisting all of the five values, whereas liberals are dominated by just two. He asks that we step outside our systems and understand the other point of view.

There is much about Haidt’s work that I like, not the least of which is that it opens up large doors to ask important questions about the relationship between psychology and politics. Consider, for example, the question: Why are so many psychologists liberal? Does psychology have an anti-conservative bias? Or is conservatism defined against psychology in some way? (Note: If you are curious, Steve Quackenbush and I wrote an article on the interface between Clinical Psychology and Politics). If psychology is going to have a large scale impact on how humans think and govern themselves, this is a crucial question the field ought to wrestle with.

Another reason I like Haidt’s work is because it is built on a sophisticated social-cognitive conception of mind and morality that is very congruent with the unified theory (e.g., see this article on the Emotional dog and Its Rational Tail).

Another positive is that he really has done an excellent job documenting key value differences underlying liberal and conservative viewpoints, which is extremely useful and helpful.

Finally, I very much share and agree with his perspective that we must have the metacognitive awareness to step outside the moral matrix and observe ourselves in relationship to others. I believe the ToK System is the ultimate meta-perspective that allows us to do that. Of course, that doesn’t mean we should stay “above the fray” because there are real issues that we need to be for and against, but it does mean we should be able to get perspective.

The positives acknowledged, I do have some criticisms. The first criticism, and I think a fairly significant one, is that Haidt misrepresents the moral values of liberals. He argues repeatedly that liberals only value the do no harm and fairness values. However, that is not really what his data say. A closer examination reveals that it is not that liberals think that in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity have NO relevance. That would be a score of a 0 on his scale. If you look at the graphs, they actually generally cluster around a score of a 2, which I believe corresponds to ‘somewhat relevant’. So the correct interpretation is that liberals value do no harm and fairness MORE than the other three, but they value the others to some degree. To me, this interpretation changes the feel of Jon’s conclusions and message. Should we not vote for a government that emphasizes “do no harm” and “fairness” over “respect for authority, in-group loyalty and purity”? Haidt wants the liberals in the audience to become reflective and wonder the extent to which they are blinded by the Moral Matrix. He uses the interesting argument that conservatives have five moral value systems operating, whereas liberals only have two. This catches the attention of the liberals, which I think is a good thing, because it suggests that liberals may actually be less complex in their thinking, which would come as a shock to their system :o). However, if we simply asked the question, what values should our government be operating from? And answer that by saying that in-group loyalty, purity and respect for authority SHOULD equal fairness and do no harm, my guess is many in the audience would say that is a seriously flawed value system. In group loyalty, purity and respect for authority are somewhat relevant, but not nearly as relevant as the other two. From this framing, the question shifts from why do liberals value only two of the five to why do conservatives value each equally? And that changes much of the implication of what Haidt is arguing for. (In a future post, I will share some very interesting work done on the construct of Ego Development. There is good reason for believing that a liberal view represents a higher stage in ego development than a traditional social conservative view, which offers another answer of why so many intellectuals are liberal relative to conservative—quite different than Haidt’s message.)

The second criticism I have is that many of the variables are confounded. First, he talks about traits, which he does so to set the stage that the mind has a foundational architecture. Yet he does not really connect the dots between Openness to Experience and the five moral systems (although I have not read all of his stuff, I have not seen this in his writing either). A factor analysis of openness to experience does NOT yield Haidt’s moral systems. So the connection between trait Openness and the five moral systems remains nebulous to me. A related criticism is that by connecting the moral values to liberal and conservative viewpoints, he is confounding morality and beliefs about the proper role and function of government. He also walks a very fine line between morality as a scientific construct (which means it is a descriptive construct…we operationalize it and examine moral beliefs and how this impacts actions and policies) and morality as a prescriptive construct (we ought to be functioning via valuing the five moral systems equally).

This last point gives rise to a final criticism, which is that the list of moral systems or concerns does not seem complete. First, while these may be five dimensions that liberals and conservatives consider when voting for a government, it seems to me there are other dimensions. Think for example of libertarians. Haidt mentions briefly in the talk that he has some ideas about Libertarians, but he does not come back to them. He is working on this, and I recommend interested readers check out a blog that deal with moral and political issues and specifically has a paper dealing with libertarians. But my point would be that libertarians hold extremely dear to the value of human freedom. (Come to think of it, so do I!) But where does freedom fit into the scheme? Surely, freedom is a moral-political-governmental value? The paper acknowledges the value libertarians put on freedom, but after reading through it I remained unclear exactly how freedom fits into the five systems. A related issue is that Haidt was talking about social issues, but as the libertarian perspective suggests, social and economic views are somewhat intertwined. This leads to the question are Haidt’s five systems moral systems or are they beliefs about the things governments should concern themselves with?

In sum, Haidt is blazing some very important trails. The five value systems approach is intriguing, his data sets are impressive and clearly he has added much to our understanding of differences between liberal and conservative values. He is also doing a great service to psychology by raising the issue of politics and the relationship between the discipline and political viewpoints. Like Haidt, I do believe there are very important questions to be asked regarding the relationship between politics and science in general and psychology in particular. Areas for future development include clarity about the nature of the “moral systems” relative to other constructs like traits and confounding issues like governmental philosophy, clarity about descriptive relative to prescriptive aspects of morality and related questions about how he is framing his results, and questions about the completeness of the five systems, at the very least addressing the question of individual freedoms.


Comments on: "Jon Haidt’s Moral-Political Psychology" (1)

  1. jasonbessey said:

    When talking about libertarians and the value they place on “freedom”, it is essential to realize that libertarians tend to distinguish between “negative freedom” and “positive freedom”, and that they tend to specifically value “negative freedom”.

    Modern liberals, on the other hand, tend to be referring to “positive liberty” when they refer to freedom. (This distinction would probably serve to clarify a lot of confusion that may exist between libertarians and modern liberals when talking about “freedom” — same semantics, but two different concepts!)

    From Wikipedia,

    “Negative liberty”:
    — Negative liberty is defined as freedom from interference by other people, and is set in contrast to positive liberty, which is defined as an individual’s freedom from inhibitions of the social structure within the society such as classism, sexism or racism and is primarily concerned with the possession of sociological agency. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_liberty

    “Positive liberty”:
    — Positive liberty is defined as having the power and resources to act to fulfill one’s own potential (this may include freedom from internal constraints);[1] as opposed to negative liberty, which is freedom from external restraint.[2] Specifically, the concepts of structure and agency are central to the concept of positive liberty because in order to be free, a person should be free from inhibitions of the social structure in carrying out their free will. Structurally speaking classism, sexism or racism can inhibit a person’s freedom and positive liberty is primarily concerned with the possession of sociological agency. Positive liberty is enhanced by the ability of citizens to participate in their government and have their voice, interests and concerns recognized as valid and acted upon.

    The distinction between “negative” and “positive” liberty is most commonly associated with Isaiah Berlin’s essay, “Two Concepts Liberty” (1958): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_Concepts_of_Liberty

    — Jason B.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

Tag Cloud

%d bloggers like this: