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Archive for November, 2011

Kahneman on Well-Being and Domains of Consciousness

Consider the following predicament and options. You are an executive, and a group of 600 people have become infected by a deadly disease and will die if you do nothing. Your advisor comes to you and says you have two options, A & B. She tells you:

• option A saves 200 people’s lives

• option B has a 33% chance of saving all 600 people and a 66% possibility of saving no one

What would you do?

Now consider it this way. You are an executive, and a group of 600 people have become infected by a deadly disease and will die if you do nothing. Your advisor comes to you and says you have two options, 1 & 2. She tells you:

• if option 1 is taken, then 400 people die

• if option 2 is taken, then there is a 33% chance that no people will die and a 66% probability that all 600 will die

Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics because he demonstrated conclusively that people do not function according to the hyper-rational, cold calculating benefit maximizing cost minimizing Homo economicus that traditional economic theory presupposes. Consider the above example. Kahneman (along with his late colleague Amos Tyversky) found huge differences in how people responded to Option A vs. B, as opposed to 1 vs. 2. Over 70% choose option A, whereas only 22% choose option 1. This is despite their being logically equivalent!

This enormous difference is indicative of what Kahneman called the “framing effect”. This finding is part of Kahneman’s larger work on prospect theory and heuristics, which laid the ground work for what is now known as behavioral economics, which analyzes how human behavior deviates from the conception of Homo economicus. (As an aside, I think that the term ‘behavioral’ economics is something of a misnomer, as it really is psychological economics).

Since his work in judgment and decision making, Kahneman has branched out and is now exploring hedonic psychology, or the study of well-being. In this post, I am going to comment on his recent TEDtalk, where he explains how the two domains of human consciousness differ quite dramatically in what it means to be happy.

Kahneman makes three key points in this talk. The first point, which is somewhat subtle in that he only briefly alludes to it, is that happiness is a complicated construct and that there has been a shift away from this term, as it has been found not to capture the essence of what researchers are interested in. In a nutshell, what researcher have ‘found’ is that the concept of happiness is too close to the smiling, happy-go-lucky, everything is chipper way of being that is somewhat trite and immature and does not really capture psychological wellness. As such, psychologists (myself included) do not talk much about ‘happiness’ so much as well-being. Indeed, in our emerging assessment of well-being (The Well-Being Interview), we query folks about ten domains of well-being, including: 1) Overall Life Satisfaction; 2) Degree of Engagement/Interest/Enjoyment; 3) Meaning and Purpose; 4) Habits and Lifestyle; 5) Moods and Feelings; 6) Relationships and Social Support; 7) Defenses and Coping; 8 ) Identity and Self-Acceptance; 9) Stressors and Affordances; and 10) Sense of Direction and Growth. 

The second key point that Kahneman makes is that humans are of two minds, what he refers to in this talk as the experiencing and remembering selves. The experiencing self is the here-and-now, in the moment feeling self, whereas the remembering self is the narrating, recollecting, reflective self that makes judgments and decisions about things. Kahneman’s work on behavioral economics was directly related to this notion of humans having two mental systems, and it is the process by which he explains many of the findings associated with behavioral economics, as he articulates in his recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow (see a recent NY Times article by Kahneman summarizing his thoughts).

The third key point–and the one that I found myself mulling over the most–was how the experiencing self and the remembering self evaluated situations differently. For the experiencing self, experience is either good or bad and there is just certain amount of it. In contrast, for the remembering self, changes, goals/outcomes, and endings are heavily weighted. To illustrate this, Kahneman shows the graph of two ‘pain charts’ of people going through a painful medical procedure. Patient A experienced high levels of discomfort for about 4 minutes, then it was over. Patient B experienced a very similar level of pain for the first four minutes, but then it trailed off and there was a notable decrease, such that it ended with relatively little pain. From an absolute experience point of view, Patient A had less discomfort. But, as Kahneman points out, it is Patient B that will report afterwards that it was not nearly as bad as Patient A. Why? Because it changed for the better and by the end it was not bad at all. Kahneman discusses the differences in how the systems respond in several contexts from vacations to income.    

From the vantage point of the unified theory, there is much to like and only a little to critique regarding Kahneman’s work. He is a brilliant experimentalist (I believe he is the only psychologist who has won a Nobel prize–let me know if you know of another) and his studies led to a whole field of behavioral economics. His work on the two mental systems, System 1 and System 2 and their corrollaries in consciousness (experiential and reflective/remembering) is directly congruent with the model of cognition advocated for in the unified theory. I also completely agree with his point about happiness, the complexity of studying it and the importance of considering it as well-being.

If I have a criticism of Kahneman it is that he is VERY cognitive. By that I mean he sometimes seems to characterize judgment and decision making as a very individual process, and he does not elaborate as much as I would like in connecting his work on thinking to either the embodied context or the social-developmental context. From a Behavioral Investment Theory perspective, the experiential self emerges out of the action of the entire body and I argue for an “embodied view” of experiential processing that is not really reflected as far as I can tell in Kahneman’s work. In addition, from a Justification Hypothesis perspective, his characterization of the ‘remembering self’ (or in his writing ‘System 2’) does not place the reflective self in a social matrix. I wish that he would write more on the social dynamics of thinking, specifically how System 2 thought exists in a social context of justification. This would also have the advantage of a) connecting System 2 to a biologically adaptive problem (the problem of social justification); b) connecting to clinical work (e.g., the motives underlying rationalizations); and c) connecting individual level thought with large scale systems of justication.

That said, his work on both the two systems, their implications for reasoning and well-being are generally topnotch.

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Jon Haidt’s Moral-Political Psychology

Jonathan Haidt (pronounced HITE) is fast becoming one of the best known social psychologists, having done influential work in positive psychology and now in moral and political psychology. Continuing with the theme of analyzing leading developments in the field, in this post I am going to comment on Haidt’s TEDTalk, which was on the moral roots of liberal and conservative politics. (Disclaimer: Jon is at the University of Virginia, which is about 40 minutes from my home, and I have presented on the JH for his lab, and I consider him a friend, although I do not know him well).

Haidt’s talk contained several key messages. First, citing Steve Pinker (another hugely influential psychologist), Haidt argues that the blank slate “was one of the worst ideas psychology ever had” and it is now clear that ‘the mind’ comes with much organization prior to experience (although, of course, that organization is plastic and molded by experience). I generally agree with this statement, although I might want clarification about what exactly is meant by experience (e.g., surely there is prenatal experience, and that might be quite crucial).

Early in his talk, Haidt mentions another key point, which is that liberals and conservatives demonstrate large differences in Openness to Experience, which most personality researchers consider to be one of ‘the Big Five’ personality traits. Although I was aware of this finding, as I listened to his talk I wondered about the relationship between trait Openness and political values. Here is the issue: Traits, at least as conceived of by the major trait researchers Costa and McCrae, are seen as almost exclusively determined by genes (although it would be the subject of another post, Costa and McCrae consistently argue this point—I, however, would challenge their characterization as over-exaggerating the genetic case for traits). Political values are transmitted largely via the family (I assume this is true, but would have to explore the research on it). So I could imagine a very interesting adoption study where the trait openness of the biological parents could be analyzed and compared to the political ideology of the adoptive family in predicting the adopted individual’s political values. If anyone knows of research on this topic, I would love to hear it.

The third and primary empirical point of Haidt’s talk is on his research on the five moral value systems that he argues underlie the liberal-conservative political dimension: 1) Care for Others/Do no harm; 2) Fairness/Justice/Equality; 3) In-Group Loyalty; 4) Respect for Authority; and 5) Purity. His research shows—across large numbers of people and many different countries—that there are very reliable differences in the degree to which liberals and conservatives differ in the extent to which they endorse these values. Conservatives tend to value the five domains relatively equally. Liberals, in contrast, value the first two domains much more than the latter three.

Haidt’s final point is we need metacognitive awareness about “the Moral Matrix”. Speaking to a group dominated by liberals, Haidt argues that we should be very aware that such a group (and disciplines like psychology) likely have massive biases against conservative viewpoints. Moreover, Haidt argues (or implies), conservatives actually have a more complicated moral system, consisting all of the five values, whereas liberals are dominated by just two. He asks that we step outside our systems and understand the other point of view.

There is much about Haidt’s work that I like, not the least of which is that it opens up large doors to ask important questions about the relationship between psychology and politics. Consider, for example, the question: Why are so many psychologists liberal? Does psychology have an anti-conservative bias? Or is conservatism defined against psychology in some way? (Note: If you are curious, Steve Quackenbush and I wrote an article on the interface between Clinical Psychology and Politics). If psychology is going to have a large scale impact on how humans think and govern themselves, this is a crucial question the field ought to wrestle with.

Another reason I like Haidt’s work is because it is built on a sophisticated social-cognitive conception of mind and morality that is very congruent with the unified theory (e.g., see this article on the Emotional dog and Its Rational Tail).

Another positive is that he really has done an excellent job documenting key value differences underlying liberal and conservative viewpoints, which is extremely useful and helpful.

Finally, I very much share and agree with his perspective that we must have the metacognitive awareness to step outside the moral matrix and observe ourselves in relationship to others. I believe the ToK System is the ultimate meta-perspective that allows us to do that. Of course, that doesn’t mean we should stay “above the fray” because there are real issues that we need to be for and against, but it does mean we should be able to get perspective.

The positives acknowledged, I do have some criticisms. The first criticism, and I think a fairly significant one, is that Haidt misrepresents the moral values of liberals. He argues repeatedly that liberals only value the do no harm and fairness values. However, that is not really what his data say. A closer examination reveals that it is not that liberals think that in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity have NO relevance. That would be a score of a 0 on his scale. If you look at the graphs, they actually generally cluster around a score of a 2, which I believe corresponds to ‘somewhat relevant’. So the correct interpretation is that liberals value do no harm and fairness MORE than the other three, but they value the others to some degree. To me, this interpretation changes the feel of Jon’s conclusions and message. Should we not vote for a government that emphasizes “do no harm” and “fairness” over “respect for authority, in-group loyalty and purity”? Haidt wants the liberals in the audience to become reflective and wonder the extent to which they are blinded by the Moral Matrix. He uses the interesting argument that conservatives have five moral value systems operating, whereas liberals only have two. This catches the attention of the liberals, which I think is a good thing, because it suggests that liberals may actually be less complex in their thinking, which would come as a shock to their system :o). However, if we simply asked the question, what values should our government be operating from? And answer that by saying that in-group loyalty, purity and respect for authority SHOULD equal fairness and do no harm, my guess is many in the audience would say that is a seriously flawed value system. In group loyalty, purity and respect for authority are somewhat relevant, but not nearly as relevant as the other two. From this framing, the question shifts from why do liberals value only two of the five to why do conservatives value each equally? And that changes much of the implication of what Haidt is arguing for. (In a future post, I will share some very interesting work done on the construct of Ego Development. There is good reason for believing that a liberal view represents a higher stage in ego development than a traditional social conservative view, which offers another answer of why so many intellectuals are liberal relative to conservative—quite different than Haidt’s message.)

The second criticism I have is that many of the variables are confounded. First, he talks about traits, which he does so to set the stage that the mind has a foundational architecture. Yet he does not really connect the dots between Openness to Experience and the five moral systems (although I have not read all of his stuff, I have not seen this in his writing either). A factor analysis of openness to experience does NOT yield Haidt’s moral systems. So the connection between trait Openness and the five moral systems remains nebulous to me. A related criticism is that by connecting the moral values to liberal and conservative viewpoints, he is confounding morality and beliefs about the proper role and function of government. He also walks a very fine line between morality as a scientific construct (which means it is a descriptive construct…we operationalize it and examine moral beliefs and how this impacts actions and policies) and morality as a prescriptive construct (we ought to be functioning via valuing the five moral systems equally).

This last point gives rise to a final criticism, which is that the list of moral systems or concerns does not seem complete. First, while these may be five dimensions that liberals and conservatives consider when voting for a government, it seems to me there are other dimensions. Think for example of libertarians. Haidt mentions briefly in the talk that he has some ideas about Libertarians, but he does not come back to them. He is working on this, and I recommend interested readers check out a blog that deal with moral and political issues and specifically has a paper dealing with libertarians. But my point would be that libertarians hold extremely dear to the value of human freedom. (Come to think of it, so do I!) But where does freedom fit into the scheme? Surely, freedom is a moral-political-governmental value? The paper acknowledges the value libertarians put on freedom, but after reading through it I remained unclear exactly how freedom fits into the five systems. A related issue is that Haidt was talking about social issues, but as the libertarian perspective suggests, social and economic views are somewhat intertwined. This leads to the question are Haidt’s five systems moral systems or are they beliefs about the things governments should concern themselves with?

In sum, Haidt is blazing some very important trails. The five value systems approach is intriguing, his data sets are impressive and clearly he has added much to our understanding of differences between liberal and conservative values. He is also doing a great service to psychology by raising the issue of politics and the relationship between the discipline and political viewpoints. Like Haidt, I do believe there are very important questions to be asked regarding the relationship between politics and science in general and psychology in particular. Areas for future development include clarity about the nature of the “moral systems” relative to other constructs like traits and confounding issues like governmental philosophy, clarity about descriptive relative to prescriptive aspects of morality and related questions about how he is framing his results, and questions about the completeness of the five systems, at the very least addressing the question of individual freedoms.

Gregg

What is a Mental Disorder?

On the heels of my criticism of Seligman’s portrayal of psychology as the science of mental disease, it seems appropriate to address the question What is a Mental Disorder? This is a hot issue right now because the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is in the process of making a major revision, from IV-R to V. In that regard, authors are considering some significant changes to the definition of mental disorder. The definition is a crucial issue for mental health professionals and society in general for many different reasons, including who has access to care and how we think about the nature of the human condition. Given the complex nature of the issues and the fragmentation and conceptual confusion in psychology (and, yes, psychiatry), it should not come as a surprise that there is much confusion and controversy regarding what exactly constitutes a mental disorder. (See, for example, this article by Gary Greenberg).

Here are some basic questions regarding the definition of a mental disorder:

Where is the line between normal variation and pathology? Are mental disorders categorically different or are do they simply exist at the extremes of a continuum?

Does having a mental disorder say anything about one’s character or should it be completely separated from that, and thus the individual should not be judged or stigmatized? What if the disorder is a personality disorder? Doesn’t that, by definition, say the structure of a person’s character is a problem?

Are mental disorders natural kinds that can be objectively specified or are they entirely the result of social values and the cultural construction of what is normal (i.e., different values will lead to different conceptions of what is a mental disorder)?

Are mental disorders essentially like other disease or illnesses in medicine or are they a fundamentally different kind of condition?

This last question is particularly important from the vantage point of psychiatry relative to other mental health professions. Psychiatrists are, of course, medical doctors, and there is thus much pressure for psychiatry to perceive mental disorders as akin to other medical conditions. Yet many mental health professionals, like professional psychologists, counselors, social workers, and marriage and family therapists are neither trained in medicine nor inclined to want to reduce the problems they see to dysfunctional biology.

If you wonder whether this issue has real consequences, check out an open letter about the upcoming DSM revisions from the Division of Humanistic Psychology. The essence of the letter is the concern about medicalizing human problems and suffering and framing the nature of mental disorders in a biologically reductionistic way. (By the way, I signed the petition).

One of my earliest articles (here in word form finalHD) grounded in the unified theory was on the question of what is a mental disorder and focused especially on the issue of whether mental disorders were of the same essential kind as other biological diseases. My answer was that some mental disorders are likely reducible to (neuro) biological dysfunction that produces harmful consequences. Consider, for example, a rather obvious case like Alzheimer’s disease. Other highly likely candidates for what I call mental diseases are autism, schizophrenia, severe cases of OCD, Bipolar 1.

On the flip side, there are many mental disorders that cannot be reduced to or understood in terms of biological malfunction. Instead, these conditions are maladaptive psychological behaviors (often of a cyclical nature) that result in excessive (or clinically significant) levels of distress and dysfunction for the individual and/or society. (The value of the article for me was affirmed when I received a call out of the blue from Bob Spitzer, primary author of the DSM III and IV and told me he thought the analysis was convincing).

I have explored the nature of disorder in some depth via the construct of depression. In an article arguing that we should consider depression a state of behavioral shutdown, I pointed out how different portrayals result in radically different notions of what the term depression means.

 “To get a flavor for why depression might mean different things to different researchers and how those different meanings might carry different sociopolitical implications, imagine two different television commercials. The first begins with an attractive woman isolating herself at a party. Everyone else appears to be having a good time, yet she stands in the background, ostensibly gripped in the throes of a seemingly inexplicable sadness. The cultural milieu is of upper middle class suburbia. A soft voice inquires and informs, “Have you experienced periods of depressed mood? Have you lost interest in things you used to enjoy? Do you feel tired, guilty, ineffective or hopeless? Depression is an illness. Ask your doctor about new antidepressant treatments available.” The implicit message of this commercial is clear. When people are suffering from depression, something has gone wrong with the physiology of the brain.

“Now imagine a different commercial. This one begins with an impoverished woman getting slapped by her husband. Her three children are having difficulties in school. Her husband controls her, and she has little in the way of social support. She recently immigrated to the United States and cannot get a job because she only speaks a little English. She frequently faces prejudice and racism. The voice overlay asks, “Have you been feeling down or depressed, guilty or hopeless? Have you lost interest in things you usually enjoy? Depression is an illness. Ask your doctor about new antidepressant treatments available.” Somehow the “depression as disease” message in this commercial is less convincing.”

I teach my doctoral students that depression is a state of behavioral shutdown. That behavioral shutdown needs to be placed in the developmental historical context to determine its nature. I further argue that, given the nature and context of the shutdown, we can further consider whether depression should be thought of as a normal reaction (in the case of extreme loss, humiliation, or chronic traumatization), part of a vicious psychological cycle (some stress or loss results in maladaptive shutting down which results in further problems and the failure to effectively adapt to the environment) or depressive diseases (when the shutdown is pervasive and occurs independent of context or changes in the environment).

This is a complicated construct with many possible threads and implications and I welcome thoughts, questions, or additional issues to be considered.

Gregg

Seligman’s Psychology: From Clinical to Positive

In the next series of posts, I am going to critically examine major lines of thought that are currently receiving much attention in the field via the lens of the unified theory. I am going to start by evaluating Martin Seligman’s conception of the field, as articulated here in this TedTalk.

Seligman is one of the most famous living psychologists, having served as president of the APA in 1996, and making a number of important contributions to the field, including the learned helplessness conception of depression, and spearheading the positive psychology movement over the past 15 years. In the talk, Seligman articulates his conception of the field of psychology, both in terms of its mission and how well it is doing, after which he proceeds to discuss what is perhaps the key concept in positive psychology, well-being. Seligman shares his three pathways to the good life, which are via positive affect, flow (or engagement in life), and meaning. (In his most recent book, Flourishing, he updated his vision, which is now called PERMA, for Positive Affect, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning and Accomplishments).

My evaluation of the talk is mixed. On the positive side, the construct of well-being is a central construct that has traditionally been under studied (see Sam Harris’s The Moral Landscape for an interesting argument that well-being is one of the central constructs in all of science—although he barely mentions positive psychology). In fact, my graduate students and I are embarking on the development of a clinician administered structured interview of well-being, The Well-Being Interview, which I believe is the first of its kind. That fact in and of itself is an indication this important construct has been understudied. In addition, with PERMA, Seligman offers a decent conception of well-being, quite similar to our approach. Seligman also deserves kudos for his ability to coordinate large scale empirical studies that are yielding good information.

On the negative side, however, Seligman’s approach is lacking in philosophical and theoretical depth. Indeed, that Seligman is neither a theorist nor philosopher of psychology was painfully apparent in his talk. Listening to Seligman’s conception of psychology, one comes to the conclusion that up until 1995, psychology was indistinguishable from psychiatry, as both were the science of mental disease. Then, eschewing hand waving, wishful thinking, and self-deception (which apparently was what the humanists were doing with their focus on optimal functioning and living constructive lifestyles), good, scientifically minded individuals like him are now leading the charge in studying the positive dimension.

Seligman claims that there are fourteen mental diseases that are treatable (and two that are curable). He makes this claim as though there is consensus in the field about what we study (which there is not) and as if the list of treatable mental diseases is generally known (it is not). Although there have been improvements in the diagnostic reliability and treatment of anxiety and depression, the idea that we can say with precision or consensus that there are 14 (not 13 or 15) treatable conditions is, to me, ludicrous, and an example of proofiness. Moreover, I would strongly contest the description of the conditions that I am guessing are on his list should be characterized as ‘mental diseases’. In fact, there are very good theoretical and philosophical reasons to differentiate mental diseases from mental disorders, but Seligman appears oblivious to such nuances.

I also cringed listening to Seligman’s conception of the field of psychology at large (a conception which is not only given in this talk but in his writing as well). One would hope that a former President of the APA would have a more philosophically grounded conception of the field. Instead, it is a simple, naïve, empirical, pragmatic view. Psychology is what the NIMH has paid it to do, which is to categorize and treat mental disorders/diseases. And now, via Seligman’s vision, psychology needs to also pay attention to the other side of the human functioning continuum. Such an approach is completely vacuous when it comes to dealing with the profound philosophical and theoretical complexities associated with the discipline. Unfortunately, it is exactly this vague conception of the field that is prominent and why so many lack an appreciation of the deeper issues.

In conclusion, Seligman has done the field a great service by highlighting the value and need to turn the methodologies of psychology to the positive aspects of the continuum. However, his conception of psychology reveals what I believe is a rampant naïve empiricism. And without a deeper theoretical and philosophical grounding, it seems likely that research in positive psychology will contribute more information about people, but perhaps little wisdom.

Gregg

I Am, Therefore I Justify

One approach some philosophers have taken to philosophy has been to identify a central, undeniable truth and then use that truth as a foundation from which to construct a system of thought. Rene Descartes’ famous dictum of I think, therefore I am (cognito ergo sum) is a prototype example of this kind of approach. The value in such an approach is in the grounding the central precept affords. The problem is that even if the original statement is valid, inferences and implications that are needed to grow the system may still be wrong (e.g., Descartes’ substance dualism).

In this post, I want to use this tactic of philosophers, but do so from the language and lens of  The Justification Hypothesis. Descartes claimed that his thinking demonstrated his existence.  I, however, want to invert this. The central starting point that I want to offer here is the statement:

I am, therefore I justify.

Following Descartes, I agree that the belief that can withhold the most intense skepticism is the belief in the fundamental existence of my self-conscious mind. I exist. I am even more certain of this than the existence of the rest of the world. For example, although unbelievable, it nevertheless remains conceivable that my brain is in a vat—ala the movie The Matrix. Yet it is not conceivable that my first person experience does not exist. (Note this does not commit me to solipsism). But the statement, I am, therefore I justify, is different than my existence. The statement is about my existence. I must both exist and make the claim that I do so. And the claim is an act of justification.

It seems to me that justification is the fundamental first act of philosophy. Any philosophy. All philosophical systems begin with the enactment of a justification, and proceed to grow via the process of justification.  One cannot engage in the process of philosophy without engaging in justification. Any starting point will be a starting claim, and thus will be a justification. And, of course, any claims to the contrary regarding the limitations, inaccuracies, or problems with any starting justification will themselves be justifications.

From a philosophical perspective, we can then begin to build a system of thought from this starting point, asking all the strangely obvious/contorted questions that philosophers are inclined to do. Is the “I” making the claim, the same “I” that went to work yesterday?  Do you exist? How do I know you exist and you know I exist? What am I made up of? The networks of claims that we develop in answering these questions is our foundational philosophical justification system. Moreover, with the concept of justification firmly in hand, we can move freely into work done on epistemic justification and work on theory of knowledgeThe Tree of Knowledge is my conceptual framework for answering these questions.

This central justification also has profound implications for one of the major long standing problems in philosophy and psychology, namely the issue of free will versus determinism. This is the problem, essentially, of whether you freely choose your actions, or whether your ‘choices’ determined by past events, and the sense of choice is an illusion. People grappling with this question wonder, on the one hand, if you are free, how is that possible given the lawful nature of the universe? And, yet on the other hand, if you are not free, they why does it seem, at least in many circumstances, that one can choose what one does? That will be the subject of another post, but for now, I will leave you with this thought…The human self is the entity that justifies the actions of the individual. Your ‘self’ is the entity that justifies your actions.

Gregg

Part III: Radical Mathematical Humanism

In this post, I share, in narrative form, the glimpses that I have had that the ToK System provides an  important piece of the puzzle toward a unified theory of everything. Before I do so, I need to be clear that I am not a mathematical physicist, and I do not  speak advanced mathematics. As such, I do not make strong claims about the  strong version. Nevertheless, the connections have been such that I believe the strong version might be true. When I first developed the ToK System, I spent an enormous amount of time reading up on and digesting conceptual models in physics. I did so for two reasons. First, and most important, it was crucial to me that the vision I was developing was consistent with physics. Second, I came to believe that the ToK offered a crucial perspective that was missing in all mathematical physical theories…and that is a theory of the knower. Specifically, the ToK System locates the scientist and scientific theory in the context of the physical universe. (These slides capture some of what I am talkin about…Knowledge Vectors).

One of the first connections I made was seeing parallels in the structure of the joint points. Recall that the joint points are links between the dimensions, thus there are four foundational joint points, between Energy and Matter (Quantum Gravity); Matter and Life (Modern Synthesis); Life and Mind (BIT) and Mind and Culture (JH). I noticed that the Modern Synthesis, BIT, and the JH could each be conceptualized as a unit of information (genetic, neuronal, symbolic) that was operated on by a macro-process of selection, (natural, behavioral, justification). That parallel made me wonder about Quantum Gravity. Of course, the quantum can be conceptualized as the smallest unit of information, so that fits. But what about gravity? Could that be conceptualized as a macro-level selection process?

Thinking about the universe as a wave of energy-information gave me an idea, namely I started thinking about gravity as a form of regression to the mean. Regression to the mean is a statistical phenomena that pertains to random forces and extreme scores. My idea was to imagine all matter in a state of quantum variation or flux. Mass could be conceptualized as clusters of information (kind of like the N in a research sample), and the distance between masses could be thought of as their “co-relation” in spacetime. I sent this idea to John Wheeler (the famous physicist who coined the term black hole), and I was pleased (and somewhat surprised) when he wrote back, calling the idea of gravity as regression to the mean intriguing. He told me it was foundationally congruent with his argument that we need to move from “It to Bit” (i.e., from things to information) in how we think about the universe.

It was during this time that I was thinking about behavior as the flow of energy information, and that the fundamental task was to determine the foundational behavioral frequencies underlying all change processes. That is when I started getting involved in string theory, which is the notion that strings coiled in hidden dimensions represent this foundational bedrock.I spent a lot of time exploring the standard model of particle physics, and developed some diagrams on the Standard Model that I was proud of because they conveyed a lot of information in an accessible way. If you look at those diagrams, the spiral shapes inside the particles represent the connection to string theory.

(note in the equations that follow, ‘p’ is pi, i is the square root of negative one and e is the natural log constant…I could not place the symbol in the text)

In 2001, I developed what I called a PseudoProof. This emerged from three lines of thought: 1) using the ToK to link measurement to observation with its theory of the knower; 2) seeing the fundamental questions in quantum mechanics as connecting to my basic definition of behavior; and 3) my conviction that the foundational unifying concept is behavioral frequencies ala string theory. I considered the formulation 2 p i f = 1 to be a metaphorical representation for connecting these domains.

But then, in 2003, I made a connection that made me wonder if it was possible that it had meaning above and beyond my own intuition. Specifically, I realized that 2 p i f = 1 could be connected to the Euler Identity. The Euler Identity (e^pi + 1 = 0) is one of the most fundamental in all of mathematics because it joins e, pi, i, 0, and 1 into one symbolic representation.  (Here is the way they connect: Euler Dear Dr).

The ToK System depicts the relation between the physical, biological, psychology, and social sciences. And it argues that it aligns, in one system, the central insights of Einstein, Darwin, Skinner and Freud. By seeing a connection between 2p i f = 1 and the Euler Identity, I had connected physics to mathematics in a novel way.

For me,  e^pi + 2p i f = 0, is my “equation” for radical mathematical humanism. It connects me to mathematics via the Euler Identity, connects me to science via the f, which represents the behavioral frequencies mapped by the ToK System, and it connects me to humanism, insofar as the connections I have made here are more intuitive and subjective and part of my story than they are mathematical physical truths. But it nevertheless is my story and thus my truth at the level of human narrative.

Gregg

Part II: The Strong and Weak Versions of the Unified Theory

In the previous post—part I of a three part series—I took the perspective of a skeptic  and argued that a unified theory of psychology is essentially impossible. An important distinction was made in Part I about the meaning of the expression “unified theory” , namely whether the expression is meant to coin a complete, mathematically specifiable description of human and animal behavior akin to the way physicists explain the behavior of particles, or whether it referred more to a workable, conceptual system that frames the subject matter in a coherent way. The skeptical position was that neither a natural science/mathematical framework, nor a consensually agreed upon conceptual system was possible.

Here I want to use the distinction between the conceptual and the mathematical science argument to make the point that there are two versions of the unified theory, one strong and one weak. The weak version is the version that I offered and defended in A New Unified Theory of Psychology. This is the argument that emphasizes the need for semantic and conceptual clarity in psychology, set against the backdrop that there is enormous conceptual chaos about foundational issues in the field. The weak version is the claim that the unified theory solves many of these issues, giving psychology a much more coherent general framework from which to understand animal and human dimensions of existence that is currently taught in the field. Of course, the unified theory achieves this perhaps most notably via the ToK System, and its novel ontological claim that the universe can be conceptualized as the flow of Energy-Information (i.e., behavior), and that because of the evolutionary emergence of three information processing systems (genetic, neuronal, symbolic), we can identify four separable dimensions of informational complexity (Matter, Life, Mind, and Culture). This macro-level view ultimately allows us to crisply define psychology as the science of mental behavior, and show that it has three great branches: 1) basic psychology, which is a natrual science concerned with the general laws of animal behavior; 2) human psychology, which is a social science concerned with the human mind and human behavior at the level of the individual; and 3) professional psychology, which is the application of psychological knowledge toward the greater good. Behavioral Investment Theory, the Influence Matrix, and the Justification Hypothesis fill in the space and provide the conceptual structure to hold the multitude of psychological paradigms together in a coherent way. In this regard, what is meant by “unified theory of psychology” is what Staats meant when he used the term, and refers a coherent conceptual framework that defines the field and unites the competing factions.

So if the weak version is that the unified theory provides a semantically and conceptually sound framework for psychology that can integrate various perspectives into a coherent whole, what is the strong version? The strong version is that it points the way toward the Truth (and the Good and Beautiful). The ‘critic’ in Part I mentioned that such a strong version would eventually run adrift because it must be grounded in physics and physics itself is not unified. The strong version of the unified theory posits that the ToK System actually does much to solve the fundamental problems inherent in quantum mechanics and gravity. Specifically, it argues that these problems are in part philosophical, and that to solve them one needs simultaneously a theory of the observer and the observed. The macro-level view provided by the ToK System provides the necessary perspective. In part III of this post, I will share how it does this and articulate a radical mathematical humanistic equation that, for me, represents the pathway to the strong version!

Gregg

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